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Putting Feelings in a Social Context: Three Case Studies Applying Gross’s
Extended Model of Emotion Regulation
Toni Schmader
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Wendy Berry Mendes
Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California
With his extended process model of emotion regula-
tion, Gross (this issue) lays out a detailed account of
the factors that inform when different people deploy
different emotion regulation strategies and how the
process of emotion regulation unfolds dynamically
over time. Such a perspective is informative, as it
reveals that individuals are not isolated agents regu-
lating their emotion but rather are embedded in
broader social and cultural contexts that inform how
best to manage their emotional reactions to events. A
notable strength of the extended process model is that
its level of detail and abstraction allows it to be fruit-
fully applied to a diverse array of research perspec-
tives in an effort to gain better conceptual traction on
the mechanisms and parameters of emotion
regulation.
Our aim in this commentary is to illustrate how the
extended process model of emotion regulation can be
applied to a few key instances where the successful
regulation of emotion is critical to meeting intraper-
sonal, interpersonal, or intergroup goals. Specifically,
we interpret the abstract elements of the extended
process model of emotion regulation in the context of
people’s experience of intergroup anxiety, stereotype
threat, and feelings of shame for wrongdoing. With
these illustrative examples, we hope to bring into
greater relief how this model can help us understand
the complex array of factors that inform how people
might best regulate some of their most difficult emo-
tional experiences within a social context.
Before delving into these examples, we want to
start by underscoring the way in which the
extended process model of emotion regulation pro-
vides a framework for understanding the role of
meta-cognitive processes (or what Gross refers to
as “perception” and “valuation”) in shaping when
people use different types of regulation strategies.
For example, the decision to suppress feelings of
frustration and anger from revealing themselves on
your face when having a difficult discussion with a
student or colleague will depend on one’s broader
appraisal of the value of anger for that context and
as shaped by past experience with that individual,
in similar situations, or from one’s life history of
personal, gender-based, or cultural socialization.
Although the term metacognition is not used in the
target article, it is a useful literature to consider as
one tries to formulate hypotheses about cultural,
person-level, and context-specific variables (i.e.,
factors in the W or World component of Gross’s
Figure 7A) that predict when and for whom differ-
ent emotion regulation strategies are used and are
successful (i.e., the A or Action component of
Figure 7A). Emotion scholars have acknowledged
the metacognitions (i.e., attitudes, emotions, goals)
people can experience about their emotional states
(e.g., anxiety about feeling anxious; frustration that
one is so sad; a desire to feel less angry; Harmon-
Jones, Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Gable, 2011;
Tamir, 2009; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). These
metacognitions themselves can be cued by lay intu-
itions about the functional role of emotions in regu-
lating our behavior and social relationships, serve
to direct the situations people approach and avoid,
and guide people to either enhance or down-regu-
late their emotional states.
In particular, as we take this metacognitive
view, the perceived value or utility of different
emotions becomes important for making concrete
hypotheses. Obviously, this places more emphasis
on the negative value we tend to assign to nega-
tive emotional states, and not surprisingly the
decision to suppress or reappraise (to highlight
these two commonly studied regulation strategies)
most often involves negative emotions. Also,
because our interest is in the role played by emo-
tion regulation in social-evaluative contexts, we
constrain our focus here to examining situations
where the decision to suppress a negative emotion
might be prompted by a metacognitive appraisal
that a certain emotional experience would interfere
with one’s social and personal goals. However, in
each of the case studies we discuss, we describe
how people’s lay assumptions about the utility of
their emotional state or the situations they find
themselves in might be altered to encourage a
more successful coping strategy such as reap-
praisal or acceptance.
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Case Study 1: Regulating Intergroup Anxiety
Interacting with strangers and acquaintances can
often elicit affectively laden intrapersonal processes
like self-presentation and impression management,
and interpersonal processes such as simulating others’
mental states (i.e., mentalizing) and attempting to
decode thoughts and intentions of one’s interaction
partner (Gilbert, 1998; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae,
2005). When interactions happen between members
from different social categories, for example, across
racial/ethnic divides, the unfamiliarity with the out-
group can lead these interactions to engender stronger
affective responses, most notably anxiety, than occur
during intragroup interactions (Bergsieker, Shelton,
& Richeson, 2010; Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter,
Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001; Mendes, Blascovich,
Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; Mendes, Major, McCoy, &
Blascovich, 2008). In addition, intergroup anxiety
can stem from xenophobia or racism, which may trig-
ger feelings of discomfort, fear, anger, and disgust.
For example, White individuals interacting with
Black partners compared to White partners, on aver-
age, show more physiological threat responses and
perform worse on cooperative tasks than Whites
interacting with other Whites, and these effects are
exacerbated when Whites hold more implicit racial
bias or have less experience with interracial group
members (Blascovich et al., 2001; Mendes, Gray,
Mendoza-Denton, Major, & Epel, 2007).
Unless people feel quite justified to express their
anxiety or hostility toward an outgroup member
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), there is often a motiva-
tion to down-regulate, modify, or suppress these
affective states in intergroup contexts (Mendes et al.,
2002; Mendes & Koslov, 2013). In fact, contempo-
rary forms of racism often implicate the process of
controlling negative affective responses so as to not
look uncomfortable, afraid, or anxious, out of either
an authentic desire to be nonprejudiced and/or an
effort to avoid appearing prejudiced to minority
group members (Plant & Devine, 1998). As with
other types of emotional suppression, efforts to sup-
press intergroup anxiety are often doomed to failure.
Indeed, attempts at modifying these affective reac-
tions when interacting with minority or disadvan-
taged group members can result in regulatory failures
such as “overcorrection,” whereby majority group
members display positive overt behavior, which dif-
fers from their internal, felt affective state (e.g., Croft
& Schmader, 2012; Harber, 1998; Mendes & Koslov,
2013). These efforts to suppress intergroup anxiety
can exacerbate one’s emotional reaction. For exam-
ple, in the aforementioned intergroup studies,
although White Americans exhibit greater physiolog-
ical profiles of threat and stress during interracial
interactions relative to same-race interactions, they
self-report more positive emotions and were more
likely to smile, laugh, and spontaneously offer posi-
tive statements (“That’s great,” “Cool”) during social
interactions with Black partners relative to White
partners (Mendes & Koslov, 2013). In follow-up
studies, when resources were limited, using a manip-
ulation of cognitive load, these positive emotional
expressions were minimized, suggesting that inter-
group interactions engage effortful emotion regula-
tory processes. Indeed other work reveals evidence
that Whites are often cognitively depleted after inter-
racial interactions (Richeson & Shelton, 2003).
Not all majority group members show indications
of threat and anxiety during social interactions with
minority group members. Those who have good
friends from the minority group do not exhibit physi-
ological threat in intergroup interactions. Although
the common interpretation from the intergroup con-
tact literature is that positive contact leads to greater
familiarity and hence reduces intergroup anxiety and
threat (Blascovich et al., 2001), it is important to note
that the reverse may be more likely. That is, applying
Gross’s extended process model of emotion regula-
tion, we note that the anxiety one feels or anticipates
feeling during intergroup encounters can lead major-
ity group members to choose situations that don’t
trigger anxiety as part of their situation selection
(Figure 6). Of course, these decisions to avoid inter-
group contact contribute to the lack of experience and
familiarity with outgroup members.
We can further apply the extended model of emo-
tion regulation to foster better intergroup contact
experiences by modifying the metacognitive elements
of these events. For example, at the metacognitive
level of Figure 7A, features of one’s World (e.g., past
negative experiences of contact, or exposure to or
endorsement of negative stereotypes about certain
minority groups) can change one’s Perception (e.g.,
Increased conscious awareness or anticipation of anx-
iety and arousal) and Valuation of one’s experience
(e.g., Anxiety could make me seem racist), which
predicts an emotion regulatory Response (e.g., I will
avoid the situation or try to suppress how I feel).
Changing any element in this process can lead to a
more positive intergroup experience. For example,
when people are encouraged to reevaluate intergroup
experiences as a means to gain a broader perspective,
they are more likely to approach rather than avoid
intergroup contact because they no longer feel it is
necessary to engage emotional suppression processes
(Trawalter & Richeson, 2006). Although this work
has not been framed in the context of reappraisal, one
can imagine that reframing one’s worldview of inter-
group contact as learning from others’ diverse experi-
ences or gaining a more multicultural perspective
likely modifies the course of emotional experience
and regulation.
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Examining how majority group members respond
to minority group members is only one side of the
intergroup interaction. Research suggests that inter-
group interactions are also affectively laden for
potential targets of bias. But in contrast to majority
group members, the goals of the interaction and the
type of monitoring required are very different. From
a motivational perspective, whereas the goals of
majority group members are to be liked, the goals of
minority group members are to be respected (Berg-
sieker et al., 2010). Minority or stigmatized group
members may monitor their environment and their
interaction partner for signs of danger or signals of
possible discrimination, indicative of more general
attentional processes like vigilance and threat detec-
tion (Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990; Kaiser,
Vick, & Major, 2006; Murphy, Steele, & Gross,
2007). These Perceptual processes are themselves
predicted by broader features of one’s World, includ-
ing developmental processes of parent socialization
(Peck, Brodish, Malanchuk, Banerjee, & Eccles,
2014), race-rejection sensitivity, and history of dis-
crimination. The perceptual processes of vigilance
then lead to a Valuation of one’s experience, such as
concerns that claiming discrimination might label
one as a whiner (Kaiser & Miller, 2001) or that one’s
actions could confirm negative stereotypes (see Case
Study 2 described next). Just as for members of the
majority, such processes can lead members of disad-
vantaged groups to avoid intergroup interactions as a
preemptive form of emotion regulation.
When we consider that both minority and majority
group members are engaged in complex processes of
emotion regulation during intergroup interactions,
there are several additional insights that can be
gleaned. For example, the overcorrecting behavior
sometimes exhibited by Whites in an effort to avoid
an appearance of bias can dynamically affect emotion
regulation processes by minorities. On the one hand,
African Americans sometimes report liking Whites
who are higher in implicit racial bias because more
biased perceivers often try to exaggerate their friend-
liness (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter,
2005). But when considering implicit and physiologi-
cal responses, African Americans who receive posi-
tive feedback from Whites are also more likely to
show signs of physiological threat, behavioral vigi-
lance, and poorer performance (Mendes et al., 2008;
see also Logel, Walton et al., 2009, for similar effects
in cross-sex interactions). That is, majority group
members’ “overcorrection” can be interpreted as dis-
ingenuous, leading to heightened vigilance and a lack
of trust (Major et al., 2014). This constant monitoring
of the person and situation by both interaction part-
ners can divert attentional processes away from the
social interaction at hand, undermining performance
and increasing stress and anxiety. On the other hand,
negative treatment by Whites might indicate discrimi-
nation and trigger feelings of anger for minority
group members, yet there are social and group costs
for claiming discrimination. Thus the cultural context
in which majority and minority group members inter-
act with one another triggers ideological perspectives
on intergroup contact (W), increasing vigilance to
negative affect and sources of threat (P), concerns
about the social costs if one’s emotional state is
detected (V), and the regulatory response to suppress
or otherwise down-regulate the feelings (R).
Case Study 2: Regulating Stereotype Threat
Stereotype threat occurs when people fear that
their behavior in some domain might confirm, either
in their own eyes or the eyes of someone else, a nega-
tive group-based stereotype (Steele, 1997). Theoreti-
cally, there are a broad range of contexts when
individuals might experience stereotype threat
(Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007), and meta-analyses have
pointed to reliable evidence that individuals under-
perform on complex cognitive tasks when reminded
of negative stereotypes about an important or salient
social identity (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Walton &
Spencer, 2009). Research in the last two decades has
made important strides to uncover a host of interre-
lated mechanisms that underlie these performance
deficits (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008). Of great-
est relevance to the present topic is evidence that the
impairments to executive function that occur under
stereotype threat are at least partly the result of effects
to suppress or push out of mind negative thoughts and
feelings aroused in situations of stereotype threat. In
situations of stereotype threat, people are more likely
to employ emotional suppression as a coping strategy,
a strategy that can be quite ineffective and counter-
productive (Johns, Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008).
Several studies now find support for the negative
effects of emotional or thought suppression in pro-
ducing performance impairments under stereotype
threat (Johns et al., 2008; Logel, Iserman et al., 2009;
Schuster, Martiny, & Schmader, 2014). For example,
women and minorities who are anticipating being
tested on their abilities divert attention away from
threat or anxiety-based words if they think attending
to these words will reveal how anxious they are feel-
ing (Johns et al., 2008). This increased tendency to
avoid appearing anxious subsequently predicts
impairments to working memory capacity needed for
successful performance on difficult math or verbal
tasks. These effects parallel broader evidence that
emotional suppression can be cognitively taxing
(Richards & Gross, 1999, 2000).
The effects just summarized can be contextualized
in the language of the extended process model of
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emotion regulation. Translating form Figure 4B, the
phenomenon of stereotype threat can be understood
as a case where a Situation (e.g., Taking a math test
as the only woman in the room.) biases Attention
(e.g., Increased attentional vigilance to errors and
mistakes) and Appraisal (e.g., If I do poorly, I could
confirm the stereotypes people have about women),
leading to an affective response that is both physio-
logical (e.g., increased cardiovascular threat or
blunted activation) and psychological (e.g., increased
anxiety or disengagement). At the metacognitive
level of Figure 7A, we can now say that the features
of the World (e.g., Past cultural or familial framings
of anxiety) can change one’s Perception (e.g.,
Increased conscious awareness of one’s anxiety and
arousal) and Valuation of one’s experience (e.g.,
Anxiety could undermine my performance and makes
me look and feel like I am performing stereotypi-
cally), which predicts an emotion regulatory
Response (e.g., I should suppress the anxiety I’m
feeling).
With this metacognitive process clearly spelled
out, one can easily formulate and test hypotheses
about how changes in the world, one’s perception,
or one’s valuation of anxiety under stereotype
threat can facilitate a more adaptive coping
response, even if the situation itself still cues ste-
reotype threat and its associated feelings of anxi-
ety. The assumption in this work on emotion
regulation processes under stereotype threat is that
people actively try to suppress anxiety because of
a Valuation they make that anxiety is perhaps both
harmful for their performance and/or likely to pro-
vide yet further confirmation of the stereotype. By
this logic, then, people should be freed from the
performance impairing effects of stereotype threat
if they hold the belief that anxiety is at the very
least benign, and perhaps even beneficial for per-
formance. In several studies, providing people
with information that anxiety is benign or benefi-
cial (or having a dispositional tendency to reap-
praise negative emotions) not only reduces the
tendency to avoid appearing anxious under stereo-
type threat but also increases performance for
women on a math test (Johns et al., 2008;
Schmader, Forbes, Zhang, & Mendes, 2009). Other
research shows that encouraging people to attri-
bute their anxiety to stereotype threat rather than
as indicative of personal failing has similar bene-
fits (Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005). And the
benefits of reappraising anxiety or stress can be
experienced more broadly, not just under stereo-
type threat, and have a measurable impact on
high-stakes testing and other outcomes (Crum,
Salovey, & Achor, 2013; Jamieson, Mendes,
Blackstock, & Schmader, 2010; Jamieson, Nock,
& Mendes, 2012).
Case Study 3: Regulating One’s Experience
of Shame
In 1971, the emotion scholar Carroll Izard reported
the results of a simple and undercited study in which
people from a variety of different countries were
asked to rate the value of several emotional states.
Across the majority of countries surveyed, shame
was rated as one of the least valuable emotions to
experience. In more recent unpublished data (Lickel,
Kushlev, Savalei, Matta, & Schmader, 2013), shame
and other self-conscious emotions are also rated to be
the emotions people are most likely to suppress.
However, shame, unlike anger, may not be so easily
down-regulated (Kassam & Mendes, 2013). People’s
tendency to want to suppress and push out of mind
feelings of shame is consistent with the prevailing
view both within and outside of psychology of shame
as a maladaptive emotion. Shame is an emotion that
people feel in response to a perceived flaw in who
they are or when a misdeed is attributed to internal,
global, and uncontrollable features of oneself (Tang-
ney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tracy & Rob-
ins, 2006). Not surprisingly, then, experiences of
shame often predict a desire to escape, deny, or avoid
situations that elicit this emotion (Tangney et al.,
1996). And when experienced chronically, shame-
proneness is predictive of poorer psychological well-
being, maladaptive behavior, and even recidivism in
criminal populations (Tangney, Stuewig, & Martinez,
2014; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992).
And perhaps especially because feelings of shame are
elevated at the mere thought that others might learn
of your wrongdoing (Smith, Webster, Parrott, &
Eyre, 2002), it should be expected that people are
loath to reveal their emotional experience of shame
to others.
However, new research is beginning to question
the prevailing view that shame, at least as a state
experience, is necessarily maladaptive. Functionally,
shame has been discussed as an outgrowth of submis-
sive displays that evolved as a nonverbal response to
wrongdoing designed to show vulnerability and avoid
social sanction or exclusion from a protective social
group (Fessler, 2007; Keltner, 1995). From this point
of view, a subjective appraisal of shame might there-
fore provide a signal of the potential for rejection and
could initiate not only prosocial behaviors to reestab-
lish connections to others (de Hooge, Breugelmans,
& Zeelenberg, 2008; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breu-
gelmans, 2007; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown,
2012) but also individual efforts to correct or change
the perceived flaw in one’s identity (Lickel, Kushlev,
Schmader, Matta, & Savalei, in press). There is now
converging evidence to support this more functional
and beneficial view of shame. For example, in a
unique longitudinal study of former prison inmates, a
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tendency to experience shame predicted later recidi-
vism only to the degree that it predicted more mal-
adaptive externalizing behaviors. Controlling for this
tendency to lash out at others, shameful feelings pre-
dicted somewhat lower rates of recidivism (Tangney
et al., 2014). In addition, a recent meta-analysis sug-
gests that an important moderator of whether state
experiences of shame predict either avoidance or
approach is the degree to which a more adaptive
response is likely to be effective (Leach & Cidam,
2014).
Such evidence suggests that given a different
metacognitive appraisal of shame, people might be
more motivated to capitalize on the personal and pro-
social benefits that this emotion can motivate. For
example, efforts to suppress feelings of shame, just as
with intergroup anxiety and stereotype threat, might
leave people feeling cognitively depleted and less
able to deploy top-down executive processes needed
to manage complex social encounters or embark on
efforts for long-term behavior change. For example,
in research branching from the thought suppression
literature (Wegner, 1994), people experienced a
heightened rebound of negative affect and lowered
self-esteem when they suppressed personal experien-
ces that were especially shameful (Borton & Casey,
2006; Borton, Markowitz, & Dietrich, 2005).
Just as we did earlier in this commentary, we can
also translate this newer work on shame into the lan-
guage of the extended process model of emotion reg-
ulation. Starting with Figure 4B (the original model),
events in a Situation (i.e., committing a wrongdoing)
can prompt Attention to others’ reactions (i.e., as
threat of punishment or rejection is feared) and
Appraisal of the event (i.e., I did this because of a
flaw in who I am) and an emotional Response (i.e., I
feel ashamed). At the metacognitive level (repre-
sented in Gross’s Figure 7A), features of the World
one lives in (i.e., cultural socialization to emphasize
self-enhancement) can alter one’s Perception (i.e.,
subjective concern with appearing submissive or
socially diminished) and Valuation (i.e., feeling
ashamed is at odds with the goal to be better than
others), which elicits the type of regulatory response
(i.e., I should suppress my feelings of shame so others
don’t find out and I don’t feel so bad about myself).
But as described earlier, these suppression efforts can
be maladaptive, might actually exacerbate shame-
based rumination and the externalization of blame
onto others.
Of importance, changing the input from the World
or the Perception or Valuation of one’s response
might effectively alter the trajectory of shame. As
past research as shown, there is cultural variation in
how emotion is valued (Tsai et al., 2006). And in
Izard’s cross-national survey, one country did not
place such low value on shame—Japan. Rather in
collectivistic cultures, the social adaptive significance
of shame is more highly valued, which is why many
collectivistic cultures have been referred to as shame
cultures (Benedict, 1946; Wong & Tsai, 2007). As
predicted by the extended process model of emotion
regulation, when the valuation of one’s emotional
experience is altered, so too is the response. Some
research suggests, for example, that people in a more
collectivist culture more willingly report and even
share with others their feelings of shame (Fischer,
Mansted, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999), and in col-
lectivist cultures, shame is not indicative of lower
self-esteem (Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). With a more
positive valuation of shame, people might reap more
of the beneficial effects of experiencing this emotion.
Conclusions
In sum, we have here tried to translate the meta-
cognitive perspective provided by the extended pro-
cess model of emotion regulation to specific
examples where people are especially motivated to
regulate negative emotional experiences. More spe-
cifically, we have examined those domains where
people experience self-conscious or negative emo-
tions that can interfere with broader personal, social,
or societal goals. Having positive intergroup experi-
ences, performing up to one’s potential, and learning
from one’s mistakes are all ways in which people can
experience growth out of difficult emotional episodes.
Yet in many of these cases, people’s lay intuitions
about the value of their emotional experiences of anx-
iety or shame might lead them to default to suppres-
sion or avoidance as the preferred means of emotion
regulation. What we have tried to highlight here is
the practical impact of Gross’s broad-based view of
emotion regulation. Efforts to change worldview
inputs, perceptual processing, or more proximally the
valuation of negative emotional states might be an
effective means to alter the outcomes of these chal-
lenging situations.
Note
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West Mall, Department of Psychology, University of
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